A theoretical attack on Time-Weighted Average Market Maker (TWAMM) pools is introduced and empirically shown to be of negligible concern to arbitrageurs herein. The effect is mitigated further in practice by the practical settings of a TWAMM pool’s order interval, be it block or time based, collating order expiries at fixed intervals for increased gas efficiencies. Additionally, it is shown that in implementation, the attack is largely circumvented by the Ethereum Virtual Machine’s accounting of gas use for SSTORE operations related to the attack.

Previous articles in this series focused on Time-Weighted Average Market Maker (TWAMM) gas usage relating to operational parameters \[1] and an efficient algorithmic approximation \[2].

Unfortunately a measurement error methodology was discovered for the non-isolating gas measurement in this article (approval and transfer figures were mixed in with contract function data). Please refer only to the isolating methodology measurements in this article. For more information consult Appendix A of the article Great Artists Steal. And Optimize: TWAMM Gas 💰⬇️, which addresses the issue and presents an improved methodology. The incorrect data is labelled “Ignore, consult update 5/7/2022” below.

Time-Weighted Average Market Makers \[1] (TWAMM) uniquely enable large trades by distributing them in time, potentially freeing market participants from slippage woes of the Constant Product Automated Market Maker (CPAMM) bonding curve. TWAMMs also simultaneously provide benefits to other market makers, like arbitrageurs in a unique symbiotic relationship.