The incident involving Tucker Carlson and his communication with the Russians through the Signal messaging app raises serious questions about the capabilities and reach of state surveillance, particularly when it comes to the activities of high-profile individuals. The claim that Carlson's encrypted messages, supposedly protected by Signal’s encryption protocol, were infiltrated by the NSA suggests a deep layer of sophistication and reach in the realm of surveillance. While the Signal protocol itself remains highly secure and has not been broken in terms of encryption, the situation points to the possibility that traditional methods of intercepting or reading encrypted messages might not have been the means through which the NSA was able to read Carlson’s communications. Instead, the most likely explanation is that the NSA could have exploited other vulnerabilities in Carlson’s phone and communication setup, including the use of mercenary spyware like Pegasus, or other more subtle techniques that bypassed the encryption altogether.

The Signal app uses end-to-end encryption, meaning that messages are encrypted on the sender’s device and decrypted only on the recipient’s device. This ensures that even if someone intercepts the messages in transit, they cannot read the content without access to the encryption keys. The encryption protocol used by Signal, which is based on the Signal Encryption Protocol (formerly known as the Axolotl ratchet), is considered among the most secure available and is widely trusted by privacy advocates. As of now, there have been no credible reports of the protocol itself being broken. Therefore, if the NSA was able to read Tucker Carlson’s messages, it likely wasn't through exploiting weaknesses in Signal’s encryption but through more sophisticated means, either on his device or within the broader communications infrastructure.

One possible way the NSA could have gained access to Carlson's messages is through the exploitation of vulnerabilities on his phone itself. Even the most secure communication protocols can be bypassed if a device is compromised at a lower level. Phones, particularly smartphones, have become sophisticated computing devices with extensive connectivity features. With the advent of highly invasive spyware like Pegasus, developed by the Israeli surveillance firm NSO Group, state actors and other powerful entities can exploit vulnerabilities in phones to monitor and extract data without requiring any interaction with the user. This type of spyware operates with the ability to compromise a phone without the user’s knowledge or consent, often through "zero-click" exploits that don’t require the target to click on any malicious links or open attachments. Once installed, spyware like Pegasus can access messages, calls, location data, microphone, camera, and other sensitive information.

Pegasus, for example, is known to exploit vulnerabilities in both iOS and Android devices, giving attackers the ability to take control of the phone remotely. NSO Group has developed highly sophisticated malware that is capable of stealthily bypassing security features, including encryption, by directly accessing the device's hardware and software layers. Even if Carlson was using Signal with proper security practices (like full disk encryption and two-factor authentication), Pegasus or similar malware could bypass these protections by operating directly on the phone’s internal system. Once installed, the spyware could send the encrypted messages in plain text to an external server controlled by the attacker, regardless of the encryption applied by Signal.

The fact that Carlson did not even tell his wife about his plans to travel to Russia and interview Putin adds another layer of suspicion to the notion that his phone may have been compromised. If his communications were truly encrypted by Signal, it suggests that his device itself could have been compromised well before he sent his messages. Mercenary spyware, such as Pegasus, can silently remain dormant on a device for extended periods, only activating when needed by the attacker to extract data. This means that even the most secure encrypted apps or services cannot protect a user if the device itself is infiltrated. Pegasus spyware could have intercepted Carlson’s communications before they were encrypted and sent to the Signal server, or it could have intercepted them after decryption on his device, bypassing the Signal encryption entirely.

While spyware like Pegasus is one possible vector for the NSA to have read Carlson’s messages, there are other techniques that could have been employed to access his phone or communication data. One method involves the use of "SIM card cloning" or "IMSI catchers," also known as Stingrays. These devices work by masquerading as legitimate cell towers and tricking phones into connecting to them. Once a phone connects to a fake tower, it can be used to intercept calls, texts, and even track a user’s location. While Stingray technology is primarily used for tracking and monitoring mobile phones through cell networks, it can also serve as an entry point for more advanced attacks on the device itself. A Stingray could be used to redirect communication traffic or gain access to a phone’s data, potentially allowing an attacker to bypass encrypted messaging apps and even install malware.

The NSA has a long history of using advanced surveillance technologies to monitor communications. Their ability to gain access to encrypted data isn't limited to traditional methods like intercepting communications in transit. A potential method employed by the NSA to read encrypted messages might have involved the use of "man-in-the-middle" (MITM) attacks or leveraging flaws in the communications network itself. While Signal’s end-to-end encryption is designed to protect messages from such attacks, vulnerabilities in the broader internet infrastructure, such as in mobile networks or Wi-Fi networks, could potentially provide an attack surface. For example, a MITM attack could involve intercepting the communication between Carlson’s phone and the Signal server by exploiting flaws in the SSL/TLS encryption layer, or by hijacking communication channels in certain network conditions.

However, these methods would require that the NSA gain access to the communication infrastructure between Carlson and Signal's servers, which is highly unlikely due to the robust security practices employed by Signal. Thus, while technically possible, a MITM attack would be a more challenging and less probable explanation compared to a device-level compromise, like spyware installation or SIM card cloning.

Another avenue that could have been exploited by the NSA involves the targeted exploitation of vulnerabilities in Carlson’s software and hardware stack. While operating systems like iOS and Android are designed with multiple layers of security, no software is immune from exploitation. Zero-day vulnerabilities, which are previously unknown security flaws in software or hardware, can be leveraged by state actors to gain access to devices and bypass encryption protocols. These types of vulnerabilities are often kept secret by government agencies, who use them for surveillance purposes or sell them to other state actors or private companies. The NSA is known to maintain a "zero-day" exploit program, where vulnerabilities in popular software and hardware are cataloged for use in intelligence gathering.

In Carlson’s case, if the NSA were aware of a zero-day vulnerability affecting his phone, they could have exploited it to gain remote access to his device and bypass the encryption on Signal messages. This would have allowed the NSA to access his messages in plain text, without needing to decrypt them through the Signal app. Given that high-profile individuals such as Carlson are often targets of advanced surveillance techniques, it’s plausible that his phone may have been targeted with such an exploit, especially if the NSA considered his communications to be of significant national security interest.

It’s important to consider the broader context of state surveillance, where the NSA is not the only agency with the ability to monitor communications. The United States works closely with allied nations, including the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network. These countries have vast resources and expertise in cyber surveillance, and they may collaborate on operations targeting specific individuals, such as journalists or political dissidents. While the NSA might have been the primary agency involved in monitoring Carlson’s communications, it is also possible that other intelligence agencies within the Five Eyes network played a role, further complicating the technical and geopolitical landscape of the surveillance operation.

It is also crucial to examine the role of third-party tech companies that may be involved in surveillance operations. While Signal itself cannot be easily breached, the NSA may have leveraged partnerships or indirect means to gain access to data or gain entry to Carlson’s communications. Tech companies often face legal pressures to comply with government requests for data, especially when national security concerns are involved. In this sense, even if Signal itself was secure, there could be other ways the NSA indirectly gained access to the data. One of the ways could have been that he backed up his iPhone using iCloud and either didn’t encrypt it or, if he did, the NSA demanded that Apple use its copy of the decryption key to turn over a decrypted copy of his iCloud data, including his messages.

Lastly, human factors—such as social engineering or insider leaks—could also have played a role in the surveillance operation. Even if Carlson believed his communications were secure, there could have been information leaks from those close to him or from within his personal network. If someone in Carlson’s circle was compromised or coerced into providing information, it could have indirectly led to the infiltration of his communications.

While the Signal protocol remains secure and has not been broken, there are numerous ways in which the NSA could have accessed Tucker Carlson's encrypted messages. The most likely scenario is that his phone was hacked using advanced spyware like Pegasus, which operates by exploiting vulnerabilities in the phone itself, bypassing the encryption on apps like Signal. Other possibilities include the use of SIM card cloning, exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, or indirect methods such as social engineering or insider leaks. These techniques, combined with the NSA’s advanced surveillance capabilities and the broader intelligence infrastructure of the Five Eyes, would have made it possible for the agency to intercept and read Carlson’s messages without breaking the Signal encryption itself. Ultimately, the Carlson incident underscores the limitations of even the most secure communication tools when faced with the full weight of state surveillance.

What Carlson Should Do To Avoid Being Hacked Again

Tucker Carlson, or anyone in a high-risk position—such as a journalist, dissident, or whistleblower—who faces the threat of state-sponsored surveillance, would need to take a series of strategic, deliberate, and multi-layered actions to protect themselves from hacking and interception of their communications. Given that Carlson is a high-profile individual with potentially sensitive information about powerful people, his communications are a prime target for surveillance agencies like the NSA, and as such, a failure to take proactive security measures makes him an easy target for digital espionage. To avoid being hacked and to protect his privacy, Carlson would have needed a comprehensive security strategy, consisting of both digital tools and a deep understanding of how state surveillance works. The following is a detailed plan that would significantly reduce the risks of surveillance and hacking, based on the current state of technology, the strategies of surveillance agencies, and common vulnerabilities in modern digital communication systems.

The first and most important step Carlson could have taken is to secure his devices. Devices such as smartphones, laptops, and even desktop computers are often the entry points for hacks and surveillance. The modern smartphone, with its advanced capabilities, is a particularly dangerous vulnerability in this respect. Phones are constantly connected to the internet, have access to a wide range of personal data, and can be remotely compromised. The most crucial component of securing a device is ensuring that it is running the most up-to-date software. Software vendors regularly release security patches to address known vulnerabilities, and failing to install these patches makes a device vulnerable to exploitation. This is particularly true for operating systems like iOS and Android, which are both targeted by state actors and cyber-criminals. If Carlson was using an outdated operating system, an exploit could easily have been leveraged against him, allowing surveillance tools such as spyware or malware to be installed on his phone or computer without his knowledge. Carlson would have been safer using Graphene OS, which is a hardened operating system that may not be vulnerable to Pegasus. If he were to use his iPhone, he should have had it in Locked Down mode, which greatly reduces the attack surface for your phone to be infected by mercenary spyware like Pegasus.

To mitigate this, Carlson would need to invest in secure, hardened devices, such as those designed specifically with privacy in mind. For example, using a mobile phone that is designed to prioritize privacy, like Librem 5 from Purism or a phone running GrapheneOS (an open-source, privacy-focused mobile operating system), would significantly lower the risk of covert spyware installation. These devices remove many of the known vulnerabilities present in mainstream phones. Additionally, regularly updating software and using custom firmware on devices that can be manually secured (such as phones that allow the installation of custom ROMs) would limit the attack surface. However, no system is fully immune to hacking, so Carlson should also consider physical security measures, such as using hardware-based encryption devices and encrypted USB drives to store sensitive information. VeraCrypt is an excellent example of open source software that creates an encrypted container to place your data on things like a USB drive or microSD.

While securing the device itself is the first step, the next essential action is to consider the software and applications used for communication. Carlson's choice of Signal for secure messaging is commendable, as it uses end-to-end encryption, which is among the most secure encryption protocols available. However, even with Signal’s encryption, there are risks that need to be mitigated. The biggest vulnerability in this case is not the encryption itself, but rather the device's operating system and other software components that can be exploited for access. Even though Signal encrypts messages end-to-end, if an attacker gains access to a device via spyware or another means, they can bypass Signal’s encryption entirely by reading the messages after they’ve been decrypted on the phone.

To secure his communications, Carlson should adopt several steps to strengthen the security of Signal and similar apps. First, he should enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) wherever possible. Signal, for instance, supports a form of two-factor authentication through an encrypted backup passphrase, which would prevent unauthorized access in case his device is stolen. Carlson should also use the "screen lock" feature on Signal and set up a PIN or biometric access (such as face recognition or a fingerprint) to make unauthorized access more difficult. In addition, a "self-destruct" option for messages could be enabled in Signal, ensuring that even if someone gains access to his phone after the messages have been read, they cannot access the full history. Also, for an additional layer of security, using a different, more secure messaging app—such as Briar—could reduce the risk of a targeted attack using zero-day exploits against Signal.

Even with robust encryption, the phone itself is a potential point of compromise. Carlson would need to ensure that his phone has adequate protection against spyware, including using trusted anti-malware software that specifically targets surveillance tools like Pegasus. Regular security audits of the phone could help detect and eliminate any malware that might be installed without his knowledge. Moreover, the phone’s physical security should be top of mind. A sophisticated hacking group or government agency could use tactics like SIM card cloning or physical device theft to access his information. Carlson should also consider encrypting his entire phone using built-in encryption features in the operating system (like Apple’s FileVault or Android’s Full Disk Encryption). Encryption of the device ensures that even if someone gains physical access to it, they cannot easily extract data without the decryption key. All Android phones are subject to being compromised by Cellebrite, which is a device used by customs to image your phone. It can crack nearly all Android phones and most iPhones except for a few exceptions. Only iPhones which are newer, running iOS 18.2 and in lockdown mode are safe, and you would also need to have it powered off before it was seized. Graphene OS phones are also safe, but these too should be powered down before approaching customs.

Beyond securing devices and applications, another critical step in protecting his communications would be to use secure networks. Public Wi-Fi, for example, is one of the easiest ways for attackers to intercept communications. Using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) is essential when using public or unsecured networks, as it encrypts the internet connection and protects data from interception. However, Carlson should be cautious of using U.S.-based VPNs due to the risk of surveillance laws, including the USA PATRIOT Act and FISA, which might compel VPN providers to hand over data. A VPN located outside of the Five Eyes countries—such as Switzerland or Panama—would be a more secure option, ensuring that his connection remains encrypted and anonymous. Additionally, Carlson should avoid using regular browsing methods and switch to privacy-centric browsers, such as Tor, which routes traffic through multiple layers of encryption and relays it through a decentralized network of volunteer-operated nodes, making it difficult for any observer to trace his online activity.

In addition to network security, Carlson should adopt basic operational security (OpSec) principles to prevent any information leaks. One critical element of this would involve minimizing the amount of personally identifiable information shared with anyone, even in seemingly innocuous contexts. Using a pseudonym for certain communications, including setting up fake accounts with unique identifiers for communication purposes, would reduce the risk of a direct attack on his real identity. Further, Carlson should regularly change any login information and make sure that email accounts, for instance, are set up with strong passwords and MFA.

Next, Carlson could significantly reduce his digital footprint by limiting the amount of information he shares on social media and other platforms. Social media, including private platforms, are excellent sources of intelligence for state surveillance agencies. Even if Carlson's communications are encrypted, the metadata associated with those messages—the time, location, sender, and receiver—can be revealing. By minimizing personal and professional information available online, Carlson would make it more difficult for an adversary to track his movements or uncover his communications, making it a lot harder for an agency like the NSA to build a comprehensive profile on him.

Using disposable email accounts and encrypted email providers, such as ProtonMail or Tutanota, for sensitive communications would further enhance his security. Carlson should avoid using traditional email services like Gmail or Yahoo, which are often compelled to hand over data to intelligence agencies. For critical communications or operations, he should consider using secure, temporary burner phones that are never linked back to his real identity, minimizing the possibility of a device compromise leading to long-term surveillance.

One advanced measure Carlson could take involves compartmentalization of his digital and personal life. By separating different types of communications, including using different devices or encrypted communication channels for separate purposes (e.g., one phone for work-related communications and another for personal messages), he would make it much harder for an attacker to access all of his information in one go. By keeping critical communications on devices or platforms that are not tied to mainstream operating systems or U.S.-based companies, such as using hardware wallets for cryptocurrencies or encrypted external drives for sensitive data storage, Carlson could significantly limit the attack surface.

Ensuring that his devices are not continuously online would help reduce the likelihood of remote access. Disabling Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and other unnecessary connectivity options when not in use would reduce the risk of exploitation through these vectors. Carlson could also consider turning off location services on his phone and ensuring that any app that collects location data is disabled or deleted. Even GPS data can reveal valuable personal information that could be used for surveillance.

Another key measure is to avoid engaging in behaviors that could expose vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks. The most sophisticated hackers often use human error or manipulation as an entry point. Carlson should be extremely cautious when interacting with unfamiliar people or when sharing information that could be used to exploit vulnerabilities. Phishing, spear-phishing, and other forms of social engineering are effective because they target personal trust, so Carlson would need to verify all sources of communication and avoid opening unsolicited messages or attachments.

Finally, Carlson should consider working with a team of security experts to routinely audit his digital and physical security. These experts would conduct penetration testing on his devices, communications systems, and security protocols, simulating real-world hacking attempts and helping to identify any weaknesses before an adversary can exploit them. Regular audits would ensure that his security measures are up to date with the latest threats and would provide peace of mind that he is not vulnerable to emerging attack techniques.

Avoiding surveillance and hacking in today’s complex digital landscape requires a proactive, multi-layered approach. Carlson, as a high-profile individual facing significant surveillance threats, would need to secure his devices, use encrypted communication channels, and adopt strict operational security practices. Additionally, using secure networks, limiting his digital footprint, compartmentalizing his communications, and avoiding social engineering would all be essential parts of his strategy. By combining secure technologies, privacy-centric tools, and careful attention to his overall security practices, Carlson could significantly reduce the risk of being hacked or surveilled. As advanced surveillance methods continue to evolve, it’s clear that the battle for privacy and security is ongoing and requires constant vigilance. One secure way for him might have been to compose his communications on a burner laptop, encrypted the message with a strong password, and saved them on a microSD chip encrypted with VeraCrypt. He would then have a trusted courier fly to Russia and present the message to the intended recipient. The password would only be known to the courier, from memory. Using Shamir’s Secret, only part of the password would be known to the courier so not even he could open the message if caught by the feds. The rest of the password would be shared via a second courier, unknown to the first courier. The recipient would need to open the message on a burner laptop using Tails and not connected to the Internet. The response would be the opposite of this process.