GrapheneOS is a custom made operating system for Android phones which hardens security and privacy tools, turning a normal Android phone into something much more secure and privacy respecting. It degoogles your phone, which is important because the NSA has a backdoor to Google via PRISM to see whatever you are doing. Of course you must also voluntarily not use Google services if you adopt a phone with GrapheneOS. The new version of Apple’s iOS, version 18.2, contains something called “Lockdown Mode,” which turns off features of the phone which have been targeted by Pegasus and Predator mercenary spyware to gain control of the phone. It reduces the attack surface. For dissidents, journalists, and whistleblowers, this is essential, because these people are at a high-risk of being hacked by the Mossad, the NSA, and other state level threat actors. GrapheneOS runs primarily on Google Pixel phones, using some of the secure hardware within to its advantage, though it ironically degoogles your phone in the process. There is no evidence that Pegasus has infected a properly configured GrapheneOS phone or an iPhone using Lockdown Mode. Too bad Tucker Carlson didn’t use this when he was trying to arrange his interviews with Putin and the NSA hacked his phone. Carlson claimed to be using Signal, which is end-to-end encrypted, thus making his communications safe—unless the NSA did an end point attack by infecting his phone with Pegasus, which would be able to view his messages after they were decrypted, bypassing the need to decrypt Signal, which is currently not possible. If Carlson was not using Signal and relying upon ordinary email like Gmail, then the NSA could easily use PRISM’s backdoor to read the messages in his in box, no problem. Gmail is not end-to-end encrypted. Ordinary text messages and voice calls on your smartphone are also not end-to-end encrypted. The NSA openly admits it can easily grab these and read them with no difficulties. If you are a journalist who works with anonymous sources, you owe a duty to them to take the utmost precautions in guarding their anonymity. Their lives may depend upon it. It means having a cybersecurity expert do an audit of your phone, your computers, and whatever else you use, and to use the best technologies available and best OPSEC practices.
When comparing iPhone's Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS on a high-end Android device for resistance against sophisticated threats like Pegasus spyware and NSA surveillance, we must consider multiple layers of security, different attack vectors, and the practical implementation of security features. This comparison reveals nuances in how different approaches to security architecture can achieve similar goals through distinct methods.
The iPhone's Lockdown Mode represents a unique approach to high-security computing by deliberately limiting functionality to reduce attack surface. When enabled, Lockdown Mode blocks most message attachments, disables just-in-time JavaScript compilation, blocks FaceTime calls from unknown numbers, prevents configuration profile installation, blocks wired connections to computers or accessories, and disables many preview features. These restrictions make many common attack vectors simply unavailable to malware like Pegasus, which often relies on zero-click exploits delivered through message attachments or web browsing.
GrapheneOS, when installed on a Google Pixel device (currently considered the most secure Android hardware), takes a different approach to security hardening. Instead of temporarily restricting features, GrapheneOS implements comprehensive security enhancements at the operating system level. It includes hardened memory allocator, extensive ASLR improvements, stronger app isolation, and enhanced verified boot. GrapheneOS also provides detailed permission controls and network access restrictions that exceed both standard Android and iOS capabilities.
Against Pegasus specifically, both systems offer strong protection but through different mechanisms. iPhone's Lockdown Mode effectively breaks many of Pegasus's infection vectors by disabling the features it typically exploits. GrapheneOS's approach involves strengthening the underlying system security to make successful exploitation much more difficult, even if an attacker finds a vulnerability. Both approaches have proven effective, though it's worth noting that Pegasus developers have historically targeted iOS devices more frequently, possibly due to their larger market share among high-value targets.
Regarding NSA surveillance, both systems offer strong protections but with different emphases. GrapheneOS provides more granular control over network connections, allowing users to completely isolate applications from network access or route them through various privacy-preserving networks. It also includes better protection against hardware identifiers being used for tracking. iPhone's Lockdown Mode, combined with Apple's general privacy features, provides strong protection against network-based surveillance but offers less granular control to the user.
The implementation of secure hardware elements differs between the platforms. Apple's Secure Enclave provides a highly trusted environment for sensitive operations, while Google Pixel devices with GrapheneOS utilize the Titan M2 security chip. Both implementations are strong, but Apple's vertical integration allows for tighter coupling between hardware and software security features. GrapheneOS compensates for this with additional software-based protections and by leveraging the open-source nature of its security implementations for widespread review and verification.
In terms of application security, GrapheneOS's application sandboxing and permission system provides more granular control and stronger isolation between apps. Users can create multiple isolated profiles for applications, each with its own set of permissions and data storage. iPhone's Lockdown Mode takes a more restrictive approach by simply blocking many high-risk application features entirely. Both approaches are valid, but GrapheneOS offers more flexibility for users who need to balance security with functionality.
The attack surface reduction in both systems is significant but implemented differently.
Lockdown Mode achieves this through feature restriction, while GrapheneOS achieves it through system hardening and enhanced controls.
GrapheneOS allows users to maintain more functionality while still achieving high security, but this requires more user knowledge and active management. Lockdown Mode provides similar protection through a simpler but more restrictive approach.
Metadata protection, which is crucial for resisting surveillance, is handled differently by each system. GrapheneOS provides more tools for minimizing metadata exposure, including better control over network connections and hardware identifiers. iPhone's Lockdown Mode, combined with Apple's other privacy features, provides strong metadata protection but with less user control over the specific mechanisms.
The update and patch management approaches differ significantly between the systems. Apple can push critical security updates to all Lockdown Mode users immediately, while GrapheneOS updates must be manually installed (though they're typically available very quickly after vulnerability disclosure). Both systems maintain strong security through regular updates, but Apple's centralized approach can potentially respond more quickly to critical threats.
Both systems provide strong protection against physical access attacks, but through different mechanisms. GrapheneOS offers more configurable storage encryption options and better protection against sophisticated hardware attacks. iPhone's Lockdown Mode, combined with Apple's existing security features, provides excellent protection against physical access but with less configurability.
For protection against zero-day exploits, both systems employ different but effective strategies. Lockdown Mode's feature restriction approach makes many potential zero-days simply impossible to exploit, while GrapheneOS's system hardening makes successful exploitation much more difficult even when vulnerabilities are found. Both approaches have proven effective in real-world scenarios.
The impact on usability differs significantly between the systems. Lockdown Mode imposes substantial functional limitations that may impact daily use, while GrapheneOS maintains most functionality but requires more user knowledge to configure and maintain optimal security. This represents a fundamental trade-off between simplicity and flexibility in security implementation.
Network security implementation differs between the systems as well. GrapheneOS provides more tools for controlling network connections and routing traffic through privacy-preserving networks, while Lockdown Mode focuses on blocking potentially dangerous network connections entirely. Both approaches can be effective, but GrapheneOS offers more flexibility for advanced users.
The protection against sophisticated hardware attacks also differs. Apple's control over hardware manufacturing provides strong assurance against hardware-based attacks, while GrapheneOS relies on Google's hardware security but adds additional software-based protections. Both approaches have proven effective, but they require different trust assumptions.
When considering long-term security, both systems have different advantages. Apple's ability to push immediate updates to all devices provides rapid response to new threats, while GrapheneOS's open-source nature allows for community verification and faster independent patching of discovered vulnerabilities. Both approaches contribute to strong long-term security but through different mechanisms.
The protection against targeted attacks, such as those from state-sponsored actors, is strong in both systems but implemented differently. Lockdown Mode's restrictive approach makes many sophisticated attacks impossible to execute, while GrapheneOS's hardening makes successful exploitation extremely difficult even for well-resourced attackers. Both approaches have proven effective against real-world targeted attacks.
For day-to-day privacy protection, both systems offer strong features but with different emphasis. GrapheneOS provides more granular control over privacy settings and data access, while iPhone's Lockdown Mode takes a more categorical approach to privacy protection. Both systems effectively protect user privacy, but GrapheneOS offers more customization options.
Both iPhone's Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS on a premium Android device provide exceptional protection against sophisticated threats like Pegasus and NSA surveillance, but they achieve this through different approaches. Lockdown Mode offers simpler but more restrictive protection, while GrapheneOS provides more flexible but complex security options. The choice between them often depends on specific user needs, technical expertise, and the balance required between security and functionality. Both systems represent the current state of the art in mobile security, and both are capable of providing very strong protection against even the most sophisticated threats when properly configured and used.
Recommendation:
Even if you have a GrapheneOS or iPhone in Lockdown Mode you shouldn’t keep it turned on and with you all the time. An activated SIM card will still triangulate your position. You can still be tracked. For those facing a high threat model, I recommend you keep your phone in a Faraday bag and turned off at all times (battery removed if possible) and only turn it on when you are actively using it. Once you are done, then back into the Faraday bag it goes. That way, no metadata is collected about you, no pattern of life is created, and you are far less likely to be successfully tracked. Using GrapheneOS or an iPhone with Lockdown Mode is the bare minimum required for use of any phone, unless it is a disposable burner phone which you bought and activated anonymously and with cash or Monero. Your phone should be used as infrequently as possible. One thing you don’t want to do is leave it on while having a conversation with your lawyer, your doctor, or anything confidential in case your phone is hacked and the microphone is turned on. This does happen, according to Edward Snowden and detailed in his book, “Permanent Record.”