Communities are the most important factors for decentralized models and it is essential for each individual to feel equal during its formation. Commitment to culture or structure, not leaders or teams, triggers the formation of the community. For example, People may give negative feedback on Bitcoin, but the negative feedback we hear about Satoshi Nakamoto is very small. The founder or developer team should be the trigger and withdraw after a certain phase. This is what Satoshi did for Bitcoin. (https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/posts/-You can link it with the last post date.)
We think that we should move away from leadership-based or core team-based structures and evolve towards collective structures by leaving traditional mindsets. The trigger should be individuals or teams, but sustainability is compromised when development is thought to depend on them. Community members will want to feel that their involvement is meaningful and has an impact on the structure they support. In the shared statistics, it has been determined that the participation in the governance voting is low and the interaction decreases as the number of community members increases.
In structures that implement on-chain governance, on-chain voting decisions are required for the desired actions in protocol contracts, groups, or treasuries.
Changes are necessary for sustainability and logically if there is governance there should be non-symbolic decisions that the governance will implement. There should not be top management that bypasses these decisions.
It is a good alternative in the ecosystem to carry out development and alternative business activities with the groups to be created. Community treasury is a must for PODs needs.
Delegation is important for on-chain management. It is the situation in which the members of the community transfer or withdraw their voting rights by appointing a delegator. Wallet addresses are designated as a delegator for community members can participate in the elections and bid. Anyone with or without otta tokens can request delegations from other people. He can do this to bid or be more effective in voting.
“ Collusion resistance — it is much harder for participants in decentralized systems to collude to act in ways that benefit them at the expense of other participants, whereas the leaderships of corporations and governments collude in ways that benefit themselves but harmless well-coordinated citizens, customers, employees, and the general public all the time.” (https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralization-a0c92b76a274 )
Due to initial VC investments in decentralized protocols, certain rights are automatically assigned to these VCs in voting due to their token ownership. Higher entitlement rights in VCs’ governance decisions unbundles the community. However, the community will still be suspicious if the founding team or the developer (labs) have percentages of tokens that will be effective in management.
The VC and the founding team can collude with an online meeting and reject or change a community request by voting against a decision made by the community. You may be thinking about game theory concepts, but the emergence of a conflict of interest in the -VC — founding team and community triangle is not a distant scenario.
Community members think that there is centrality in decentralization for this or reasons that we have not discovered until now, and they have difficulty making sense of their participation.
Decentralized communities that have only the community at their center will build the future.