Introduction

Over the past two decades, municipalities have invested billions of dollars of public funding into stadiums for professional sports franchises and the industry of professional sports has seen explosive growth. Franchise values and player salaries have grown exponentially and star athletes command strong influence over public opinion through traditional and social media platforms. As the business of professional sports grows, it is important to take a critical lens to its relationship with municipal governments. Professional teams and their owners have enjoyed monopoly-like power and have historically attracted lucrative incentives from local governments. In the future, it is likely that professional franchises will have increased influence over cities and continue to use the promise of economic development to demand public financial incentives for their facilities. As citizens, we must carefully analyze the outcomes of past public investments in order to make wise decisions for the future. Sports stadiums are often advertised by their promoters as economic boons to communities, but do they live up to the hype? This paper presents a comparative case study of two stadium development projects in San Antonio, Texas. In doing so, I look to explore the role professional sports stadiums play in urban development and the appropriateness of using public funds to develop them.

Literature Review

There is a growing body of academic research devoted to the topic of professional sports stadiums and their effectiveness in promoting economic development. In The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities, Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) provide a historical account of the use of public funding for professional sports stadium development. The authors explain why new stadium construction is not an economically attractive option for private capital, and therefore must heavily rely on public funding. The article also explains that professional sports leagues enjoy an effective monopoly by controlling the supply of teams in order to discourage competition, resulting in the greater ability to extract subsidies from local municipalities. The authors highlight that there is little evidence that sports stadiums generate meaningful economic development benefits and conclude the article with a series of policy suggestions that would better position municipalities to negotiate with the various stakeholders within professional sports.

There is some evidence that stadiums can be used to promote economic development when incorporated in the context of a thoughtful and strong planning agenda. Stadiums incorporated within larger downtown redevelopment efforts have yielded some of the best results, likely because those cases included more rigorous planning initiatives than in urban fringe or suburban locations. Newsome and Comer (2000) document a trend away from suburban professional sports stadium development, in favor of downtown-centric revitalization plans. Their research focuses on intra-urban stadium relocations in the U.S. across two time periods: 1965-1985 and 1985-1997. A chi-square analysis was used to determine the significance of relocation patterns across three categories of intra-urban locations: downtown, central city and suburban. Results differed across the four major professional leagues, but all show a clear trend towards downtown stadium locations. The article highlights the central role stadiums have played in downtown redevelopment plans, as well as the social and economic implications for such tactics. Newsome and Comer build upon Robertson’s research on downtown redevelopment and special activity generators. In Downtown Redevelopment Strategies in the United States: An End-of-the-Century Assessment, Robertson (1995) provides a sweeping history of American downtown formation and development, and introduces the concept of pedestrianization as a key indicator of successful downtown spaces. The author gives detailed explanations of urban redevelopment strategies such as historic preservation, waterfront development, and office development. Arenas and sports stadiums fall under the larger category of “special activity generators”, which also includes convention centers and festival marketplaces. Robertson notes a trend towards downtown stadium development, but also highlights their limitations as economic anchors.

Research has verified that stadium development has a positive effect on surrounding residential land values. Feng and Humphreys (2018) analyzed two privately financed professional sports stadiums in Columbus, Ohio and their impact on surrounding residential property values. Nationwide Area (NHL) was a $150 million project, located in downtown Columbus and was a core element of a long-term urban redevelopment plan. Crew Stadium (MLS) was a $25 million project located outside of downtown in the former parking lot of the Ohio State fairgrounds and was not part of a larger redevelopment plan. The authors used a spatial hedonic approach which showed that both facilities, despite their differences, had a positive effect on the value of surrounding property values. This positive effect decreased as the distance from the stadium increased. The article goes on to argue that tax subsidies for professional sports stadiums may be justified, because their presence generates intangible economic benefits for a community, despite the location or existence of a larger development plan. Ahlfeldt and Maenning (2010) also developed a hedonic price model to explain the impact of three sports arenas on standard land values in downtown Berlin. The facilities were located in depressed neighborhoods and touted as economic development generators. Their research found that the arenas had significant positive impacts on land values within a radius of about 3,000 meters. However, without substantial job creation and wage growth, rising land values have the potential to displace the residents the stadiums were supposed to benefit.

There have been a series of insightful case studies on specific stadium projects. Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) analyzed four cities’ attempts at downtown revitalization through professional sports stadium development: Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Indianapolis. Specifically, the article explores whether sports facilities are an effective strategy for cities to combat the trend towards decentralization and suburbanization of economic activity. The analysis reviews population, employment, and income data to highlight trends between downtown and suburban areas between 1992-2000. The study found that Cleveland and Indianapolis were able to increase the number of jobs in their downtown, thanks to business sector support combined with deliberate planning and economic development efforts focused on sports and hospitality. Despite acknowledging successful efforts in Cleveland and Indianapolis, the authors express some concern about the opportunity cost of such strategies compared to other uses for public resources. Bornstein (2010) examined stadium projects in Montreal, Vancouver and Los Angeles, with a focus on which projects prioritized the quality of residential areas and needs of low-income households. The article reviews how agreements were reached, the form they took and neighborhood outcomes. The paper concludes by noting that new collaborations between community-based actors and novel planning processes are emerging in parallel to the rise in mega-projects.

In Sports facilities as urban redevelopment catalysts: Baltimore's Camden Yards and Cleveland's Gateway, Chapin (2004) presented two case studies of highly acclaimed urban stadium-led economic efforts in Baltimore and Cleveland. The literature review takes an overwhelming negative view on stadiums’ potential to provide economic benefits to urban areas. The author specifically studies the subject stadiums’ ability to catalyze physical redevelopment in their city’s urban core. Robertson’s “special activator generator” methodology was used as a framework by which to measure the amount of physical urban redevelopment each stadium generated. Chapin concludes that Cleveland’s Gateway project successfully catalyzed meaningful redevelopment while Baltimore’s Camden Yards did not move the needle in a significant way. He even noted that in some cases the Orioles franchise blocked surrounding development projects due to perceived competition for entertainment spend. Spirou (2010) investigated four professional sports stadium projects in Chicago and their role in urban core redevelopment efforts through a cultural and political lens. The author places professional sports within the context of a larger trend of cities competing to become destinations for urban tourism. The article contains detailed case studies profiling the political and economic maneuverings that professional sports teams used in order to obtain new or upgraded stadiums in Chicago’s urban core. The author repeatedly acknowledges that professional sports teams leverage inter-urban competition through the threat of relocation in order to obtain the most favorable economics for their facilities. 

Trendafilova et. al. (2012) studied the role of professional sports in Detroit’s downtown revitalization efforts. Their research focused on qualitative data, utilizing a panel interview method to understand perceptions about professional sports effectiveness as a downtown revitalization tactic. The interviews uncovered three major themes, the first of which highlighted positive economic effects stemming from clustering multiple stadiums in the downtown area. The second theme focused on how sports helped reshape a positive image of downtown Detroit for residents and tourists alike. The third theme was an acknowledgement of the challenges around using sport as a downtown revitalization tool. The article states that sports are volatile and cannot revitalize an area with accompanying economic development efforts and thoughtful urban planning.

Research Questions & Methods

This paper presents a comparative case study of the site selection and community planning processes for two professional sports stadium development projects in San Antonio, Texas: The Alamodome and AT&T Center. Both stadiums were located in San Antonio’s economically depressed East side, the Alamodome directly adjacent to the city’s downtown and the AT&T Center built in the urban fringe three miles to the east. This comparative case study is focused on qualitative factors and inquires into the political processes that informed the site selection of each stadium. Previous academic literature suggests that communities are most likely to receive economic development benefits from downtown stadiums created within the context of holistic urban core redevelopment planning efforts. The central research questions asked in this paper are: 1) What influence did existing city and community plans have on decision making and stadium site selection? 2) How did the political climate affect the development and location selection process? 3) What role did community engagement and the public have in the stadium development process? 4) How did transportation considerations play in the site selection and stadium development process?

In order to answer the proposed research questions, I rely on evidence from existing city plans and written accounts from stakeholders that participated in the stadium development process. Established case study methodology encourages researchers to answer specific research questions using a range of different sources of evidence in order to present a holistic view of an issue. Qualitative data is used to build a strong foundation of understanding and to create deep context through which quantitative data can be interpreted (Gillham 2000, Yin 2014). In Rethinking Case Study Research: A Comparative Approach, Bartlett and Vavrus explain how comparative case studies can use a process-oriented approach to highlight common influences across multiple cases, as well as understand the perspectives of social actors involved in a case and highlight the dynamics of power and inequality between stakeholders (2017). Through this current study, I hope to create an understanding of each stadium’s site selection process upon which further quantitative research can be conducted.

The Alamodome

Henry Cisneros served as San Antonio’s mayor from 1981 to 1989 and throughout his tenure was a champion for the revitalization of the city’s downtown. Cisneros was an academic who earned a master’s degree in Urban and Regional Planning and a doctorate of Public Administration. Early in his career Cisneros served as the assistant director of San Antonio’s Model Cities program, and his experiences developed into a belief that government had a strong role to play in economic development. He was quoted stating, “I learned during those years that government is wise to put its money in physical projects … because only physical projects leave a lasting legacy” (Johnson 2020).  He was a strong advocate of public-private partnerships and his time as mayor was marked by large scale urban development projects.

One of Cisneros’ final accomplishments as mayor was the launch of the Alamodome development. The Alamodome was developed with the hope of attracting an NFL team to the city of San Antonio. The city took an “if you build it, they will come” approach and Cisneros was encouraged by local businessmen interested in acquiring an NFL franchise such as N.B.A. Spurs franchise’s majority owner Red McCombs. Mayor Cisneros worked with state representatives Cyndi Krier and Frank Tejeda to pass a bill that authorized a half cent temporary sales tax increase to finance the project, contingent upon voter approval. Cisneros then used his political prowess to lead a grassroots campaign through which he extolled the economic benefits a new stadium and NFL team would bring to the city. Two major groups came out in opposition of the tax increase, the Homeowner-Taxpayer Association and Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS). The Homeowner-Taxpayer Association was a fiscally conversative group that opposed any tax increases while COPS lobbied for the needs of inner-city minority communities, arguing that stadiums were an inappropriate use of public funding (Wolff and Cisneros 2012). Despite the efforts of both groups, Cisneros was able to rally support for the proposed stadium and voters approved a half cent sales tax increase from January 1989 to April 1994. These funds financed the construction of the $186 million stadium adjacent to San Antonio’s downtown and convention center.

The city identified the 55-acre Alamo Iron Works industrial manufacturing plant as a viable location for the future Alamodome. The site was adjacent to San Antonio’s downtown in a low-income, predominantly African American neighborhood. In the mid-20th century, the Near East side was a vibrant, black working class neighborhood that contained a strong social fabric made up of successful businesses, popular entertainment venues and religious institutions. During the second half of the 20th century San Antonio experienced high levels of suburbanization, a nation-wide phenomena often referred to as “white flight”. This pattern of migration devalued many urban core neighborhoods. Additionally in 1967, the construction of Interstate Highway 37 “physically and psychologically” (City of San Antonio 1993) separated the neighborhood from downtown and the area suffered a prolonged period of economic stagnation resulting in high real estate vacancy and crime rates. A large city cemetery on the neighborhood’s eastern border limited growth opportunities and further contributed to the area’s undesirability. From 1970 to 1990 the census tracts surrounding the Alamodome experienced a 23% decline in population and 16% decrease in property values. Over the same time period, the area’s black population declined by 51% percent and the white population decreased by 61%. Housing vacancy rates rose from 9% in 1970 to 17% in 1990, representing a 60% increase as the neighborhood fell into disrepair (City of San Antonio 1993).

After identifying the Alamo Iron Works as a potential site, the city commissioned the Urban Land Institute in December 1989 to conduct a panel study in order to understand and mitigate the effects of developing a stadium in an established neighborhood. Increasing community concerns over gentrification and traffic during the design phase convinced project leadership that an official planning process was necessary in order to better engage the affected community. In 1991, the Dome Advisory Committee engaged the City of San Antonio’s Department of Planning to study “the impact of the Alamodome on the neighborhoods adjacent to and in close proximity to the Alamodome site” and to develop “a plan to minimize the negative effects and encourage a positive influence of the Alamodome on the quality of life within the affected area” (City of San Antonio 1993). As a result, a special planning team was created to develop a master plan for the area immediately surrounding the site of the proposed stadium. This team conducted an extensive planning and community engagement process which resulted in the Alamodome Neighborhood Plan which was approved by city council and signed by Mayor Nelson Wolff on May 6, 1993. This planning process was initiated during the summer of 1991 with the following goals: 1) To enhance the quality of life in the immediate Eastide by providing for additional housing and business opportunities and 2) To mitigate any negative effects the Alamodome might have related to traffic access and parking in the neighborhood (City of San Antonio 1993).

The planning team conducted a public engagement process through which they engaged the neighborhood's civic, non-profit, and religious community leadership and “hosted three community forums; surveyed area residents, property owners and businesses; collected and studied previous studies of the area; and completed field surveys of current land use and housing conditions” (City of San Antonio 1993). Property owners, residents and businesses were surveyed by mail and in-person interviews and expressed that drug use, prositution, vandalism and crime were major issues in the area. This public engagement process was used to inform the creation of six formal recommendations for the area which included: the creation of a new Neighborhood Conservation District for the residential community immediately surrounding the new stadium, targeted redevelopment efforts for the nearby historic St. Paul’s square, and the implementation of a new Transportations Operations Plan that would leverage a newly constructed VIA Transportation Terminal. The new VIA Transportation Terminal was constructed adjacent to the stadium with the hope of encouraging the use of public transportation and to mitigate anticipated parking and traffic pressures for the surrounding community.

The 65,000 seat stadium officially opened on May 15, 1993 and from inception has been owned and operated by the City of San Antonio. Without a prospective NFL team, the city negotiated a lease with the San Antonio Spurs who had outgrown their original downtown stadium, the Hemisfair Arena. The Spurs lease made the Alamodome a profitable operation, generating $4 million annually, and brought vibrancy to the surrounding area (Wolff and Cisneros 2012). The franchise quickly realized the awkwardness of playing in a cavernous stadium designed for football, and almost immediately began lobbying for a basketball-specific stadium. The Spurs left the Alamodome for the AT&T Center in 2002 and their departure removed the Alamodome’s major revenue stream. The stadium has struggled to recover, especially since the city has never been able to attract an NFL team. Over the past two decades, the Alamodome has had to be opportunistic in finding tenants and has hosted a wide range of events over the years. It is currently the homefield of the University of Texas at San Antonio’s collegiate football team and hosts annual sporting events such as the Valero Alamo Bowl, Army All-American Bowl and the occasional NCAA Final Four.

AT&T Center

In 1973, the American Basketball Association’s Dallas Chaparrals were relocated to San Antonio and renamed the Spurs. The team’s initial homecourt was Hemisfair Arena, a small facility originally developed for the 1968 World’s Fair. The team gained popularity throughout the 1970’s and joined the National Basketball Association, prompting the city to expand the arena’s capacity from 12,500 to 18,500 (Wolff and Cisneros 2012). In 1992, the Spurs ownership group led by Red McCombs relocated the team to the newly constructed Alamodome. The Alamodome quickly proved to be unsatisfactory to the franchise’s needs and ownership began to lobby the city for a basketball-specific stadium, threatening to relocate to a different city if not accommodated. In 1996, local businessman Peter Holt became the team’s majority owner, reaffirmed the Spurs’ commitment to San Antonio and began aggressively negotiating for a new stadium. In Transforming San Antonio: An Insider's View to the AT&T Arena, Toyota, the PGA Village, and the Riverwalk Extension, Nelson Wolff, who served as both mayor and county judge, provides a political insider’s perspective of the process leading up to the construction of the AT&T Center in San Antonio’ East side. The book provides insight on the rollercoaster of political and financial maneuverings that made the stadium’s development possible.

The franchise was both strategic and opportunistic in their approach to pursuing the new stadium. The Spurs hired key community stakeholders to build a coalition of support including Leo Gomez, former president of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and Tullis Wells, a former chairman of the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce. The city initially showed a lack of interest in funding a new downtown stadium, so Holt pursued a suburban location in Northeast San Antonio in partnership with a local real estate developer and land owner. The proposed plan required the creation of a tax increment district, within which the taxes from future development would pay down the stadium’s incurred debt. The Northeast Independent School District voted down this proposal and blocked the project from moving forward. After this public defeat, the Spurs organization shifted strategies and explored a potential partnership with either the city or county municipal government. Holt and the Spurs organization collaborated with state representatives to “develop a bill allowing major urban cities to build sports venues with a combination of taxes, including the hotel-motel tax and sales tax, as well as fees on rental cars, tickets, and parking” (Wolff and Cisneros 2012). The Texas state legislature passed the proposed bill in 1997 which required voter approval and included an important amendment that allowed both city and county governments to leverage taxes for stadium development. This key piece of legislation enabled the Spurs organization to create a competitive dynamic between the city and county governments while negotiating for a new facility.

In 1999 the Spurs won their first N.B.A. Championship, which inspired widespread public support for the franchise and greatly strengthened their negotiating position. Local officials felt compelled to provide a new stadium, but had differing views on site selection. Mayor Howard Peak and the city government pushed for a downtown location, while County Judge Cyndi Krier advocated for the use of a 175-acre county-owned site three miles east of the Alamodome on the urban fringe of San Antonio. The county’s preferred site had an existing facility named the Freeman Coliseum and historically had hosted San Antonio’s annual Stock Show and Rodeo.

The city proposed a plan that continued Henry Cisneros’ legacy of downtown revitalization, but relied on obtaining voter approval for a widely unpopular sales tax increase to develop a new stadium adjacent to the Alamodome. The 1999 Downtown Neighborhood Plan designated the southeast portion of downtown from Hemisfair Park to the Alamodome as a “special events district”, especially suited for any future stadium development (City of San Antonio 1999). Mayor Peak said of his vision, “I told the Spurs I wanted to protect the public investment in the dome by building the arena on the south parking lot of the Alamodome, connecting the two facilities by an underground tunnel. I proposed that the two facilities should be both managed by the city. I said downtown offered a better venue for sports fans because restaurants, retail, and hotels were within walking distance. I told the Spurs we could pass the sales tax” (Wolff and Cisneros 2012). The city’s proposal entailed a ten year sales tax increase of a quarter cent to finance the stadium’s construction. In return, they required the Spurs to be responsible for the construction of the arena and commit to a twenty-year lease with a $1.5 million annual payment. The city would own and operate the arena, have the right to rent the stadium when not in use by the Spurs, and share in the income from naming rights, concessions, tickets sales and parking. Unfortunately the Spurs did not view these terms as financially attractive nor did they have confidence in Mayor Peak’s ability to get voter approval for another sales tax increase. The city’s previous investment in the Alamodome was not a proven success and the public showed a strong aversion to any additional increase in sales tax, viewing it as an unnecessary burden on local residents. Voters viewed a hotel-motel tax increase as more favorable than the sales tax, preferring that tourists carry new financial burdens rather than local residents. The local tourism industry had strong ties to city government and lobbied against any increases in tourism-related taxes, blocking the city from exploring that option.

When the city refused to entertain alternative options, the county government countered with a plan using the county-owned land and an increased hotel-motel tax to finance an arena. The county government did not have the same allegiance to the tourism industry and was able to ignore it’s outcry. After a prolonged series of negotiations, the Spurs accepted the county’s proposal in which a new stadium was financed with $146 million of hotel-motel and car rental taxes and a $28.5 million contribution from the Spurs organization. While the county would own the stadium, the Spurs were responsible for building and operating the arena, covering all construction cost overruns, and agreed to a twenty-five year lease with a $1.3 million annual payment. Importantly, the Spurs maintained control of negotiating naming rights and would receive all revenue from parking, advertising, and arena rental. Voters overwhelmingly supported the proposal and passed the county’s hotel-motel tax increase by a count of 113,583 to 71,788 (Wolff and Cisneros 2012).

As construction commenced on the stadium, a community-wide planning effort was launched in August of 2002. This process was led by an eighteen person steering committee composed of representatives from the Spurs, Bexar County, the City of San Antonio’s planning department, San Antonio-Bexar County Metropolitan Planning Organization and local neighborhood groups. Three community meetings were held between October 2002 and February 2003 that had a total attendance of 218 people (City of San Antonio 2003). The steering committee engaged consultant Economics Research Associates to create a neighborhood revitalization plan with three areas of focus: Real Estate Market Evaluation, Land Use and Community Facilities and Plan Implementation. Separately, the San Antonio-Bexar County Metropolitan Planning Organization engaged consultant Parsons Transportation Group, who developed the East Corridor Multi-Modal Alternatives Plan that addressed mid-term and long-term transportation improvement opportunities. The combined studies comprise the Arena District/Eastside Community plan, which was approved by San Antonio’s City Council in December 2003 to be adopted as part of the city's Comprehensive Plan.

The neighborhoods surrounding the AT&T Center reflected similar demographic trends as those around the Alamodome, having experienced a prolonged period of neglect and economic stagnation throughout the second half of the 20th century. The stadium was located on the border between struggling Eastside residential neighborhoods and an urban fringe established industrial area. Between 1990 and 2000, San Antonio as a city gained over 200,000 residents, but the census tracts surrounding the AT&T Center site lost over 1,000 residents. Over the same period of time, the area’s black residents decreased from 54% to 42% while hispanics grew from 39% to 52% of the area’s population. The area was plagued by high levels of poverty and low levels of educational attainment. The 1999 median income of the area was $21,469, which was an improvement from the 1989 area’s median income of $12,870 but still $14,745 below the city-wide median income. In 2000, the 43% area’s residents had not received a high school degree and only 9% had earned a college or advanced degree. The community was also experiencing housing vacancy rates of 12.9%, over double the city-wide rate of 6.4%. The plan notes an increase of younger families moving into the area in search for affordable housing approximate to the downtown (City of San Antonio 2003).

The plan recommends the creation of an Arena District Authority and a Public Improvement District around the stadium, entities which would have the power to raise capital through taxes and bond issuances in order to fund much needed community investment such as infrastructure improvements. The highest priority recommendation is a series of road and infrastructure improvements required by the community. These improvements ranged from the repaving and reconstruction of neighborhood streets to improved bus stations to encourage use of public transportation. The facility relied almost entirely on automobile transportation and was surrounded by seven surface parking lots with over 7,000 spaces to accommodate a seating capacity of 18,500. Public transportation has never played a large role for the arena, but the facility recently added a ride-share lot in response to the rise in popularity for ride-sharing services.

The AT&T Center opened in November of 2002 and has been the home of the San Antonio Spurs for eighteen seasons. Additionally, the stadium hosts the San Antonio Stock Show and Rodeo annually in February and is a premier event and concert venue for the city. In 2015, the AT&T Center received a $110 million renovation in an effort to update the facility and provide a more modern fan experience. Technology was the major focus of these renovations, along with new seating and infrastructure improvements to the structure.

Discussion

In the case of the Alamodome, the city had a strong political leader in Henry Cisneros who believed in the value of downtown revitalization. Cisneros’ downtown development agenda heavily informed the site selection process for the stadium, much more so than formal planning and public engagement efforts. The Alamodome Neighborhood plan states that “this plan for the Alamodome area is a special neighborhood plan initiated by the City because of the anticipated effects of the Alamodome” (City of San Antonio 1993). This language is evidence that the city took a reactionary approach to planning and community engagement after deciding on the prospective location. Similarly, the Area District / Eastside Community Plan was started in August 2002 and finished in December 2003, after the construction on the stadium had been completed. The timing of these events indicates that the planning process and community’s input were not a major factor in the site selection and development process, instead the planning process followed after key decisions were made. These two cases show a clear pattern of behavior by San Antonio’s local government actors. The planning and community engagement process did not meaningfully influence the site selection of either stadium, instead leadership initiated a planning process well after decisions were made in a top-down fashion. 

Henry Cisneros and the city government had complete control of the site selection process for the Alamodome. Cisneros had a vision of downtown revitalization, but this vision was not codified in a formal city plan. Cisneros was able to use his political influence at both the state and local levels to obtain public funding for a proposed stadium that had no concrete tenant. The city speculatively built a downtown football stadium which then failed to attract a professional N.F.L. team to the city. In the case of the AT&T Center, the San Antonio Spurs pressured local government to satisfy their demands for a new facility. The franchise created a competitive environment in which they were able to leverage the city and county governments against each other to achieve the best financial option for their business. The city lacked strong political leadership and failed to convince the Spurs and the public of the benefits of a downtown stadium. The Spurs prioritized their bottom-line over the city government's urban planning agenda. The result was that the AT&T Center was developed in San Antonio’s urban fringe, in a location that added little economic development value to the city of San Antonio.

The Alamodome planning effort spent considerable energy on transportation issues, however stakeholders were mainly concerned with mitigating the expected pressures of increased vehicular traffic on the surrounding residential neighborhoods and the management of parking. The Alamodome included only 3,700 on-site parking spaces for the 65,000 seat area. The plan heavily relied on public transit adoption and a key aspect of the project was a VIA Transportation Terminal which was designed to accommodate 150 buses as well as a system of downtown shuttles and Park and Ride services. Despite these efforts, in my opinion the city missed a large opportunity to proactively encourage public transit by connecting downtown with the surrounding areas of the city. The Transportation Terminal has failed to encourage a widespread embrace of public transportation and is more of an afterthought for most present day San Antonio residents. The project and Alamodome Neighborhood Plan put forth a valiant effort to encourage pedestrian traffic and reconnect the Near Eastside neighborhood with downtown San Antonio and repair some of the damage caused by the construction of I-37. There were two pedestrian walkways created linking Alamodome directly to the downtown in addition to a renovated underpass to the north at St. Paul Square. In contrast, the AT&T Center made no meaningful attempts to incorporate public transportation options as a part of the facility. The stadium is surrounded by over 7,000 surface parking spaces, which discourage pedestrian activity and effectively act as a barrier between the arena and the surrounding community.

Despite the city’s failure to attract a NFL team, one could argue that the Alamodome’s development has contributed to the revitalization and redevelopment of parts of the Near Eastside and helped attract capital to the area. St. Paul Square is located directly to the north of the stadium and is the main thoroughfare between downtown and the Near Eastside as well as a site of historical significance. The Alamodome Neighborhood plan stressed the importance of pedestrian connectivity within this area and actively encouraged it’s redevelopment. The VIA Transit Terminal was strategically located in between the Alamodome and St. Paul’s Square so that both projects could be accessible by public transportation. Since the development of the Alamodome, St. Paul’s Square and the surrounding residential neighborhood have experienced significant redevelopment and gentrification. In 2019, Realtor.com named the Eastside Promise Neighborhood one of America’s “Top 10 Fastest Gentrifying Neighborhoods” with a five-year median residential sale price increase of 78.5% (Lambert 2019). Private developers have acquired and redeveloped substantial portions of St. Paul’s Square, recently completing a 271-unit apartment complex named The Baldwin in 2018. In 2001, Spurs player David Robinson built a private school named the Carver Academy on East Commerce Street. This school sparked renewed interest in the Eastside as well as providing quality education options for low-income students in the area. In 2012, the school merged with charter school IDEA Public Schools and now serves over 1,300 students. IDEA has since built three schools in the Eastside neighborhood which are providing high-quality education to over 3,600 students. This wave of development on the Eastside of San Antonio cannot be solely attributed to the construction of the Alamodome, but the stadium has undoubtedly been a major contributor. The area surrounding the AT&T has been much slower to develop. The AT&T Center acts more as a walled garden rather than a catalyst. The stadium is surrounded by an ocean of parking that discourages visitors from interacting with the surrounding community and depriving nearby businesses from their patronage. To this day, the surrounding community has seen little additional investment or commercial activity. It remains largely the same as before the AT&T Center was built, a struggling industrial and residential area on San Antonio’s urban fringe.

It is also important to consider these two stadium locations in relation to San Antonio’s most recent comprehensive plan which was approved in 2016. The SA Tomorrow Plan identifies thirteen regional growth centers across the city. These areas are to be prioritized for density, job creation and connectivity. The regional centers are then categorized into Activity Centers, Logistic/Service Centers and Special Purpose Centers. The Central Business District, which includes the Alamodome, was designated one of eight Activity Centers. These Activity Centers are envisioned as areas that “have high concentrations of people and jobs in a mixed-use environment. They should be highly walkable and well connected by multiple types of transportation and transit. They should have an even mixture of jobs and housing and contain amenities that support residents, workers and employers within the centers and also throughout the city” (City of San Antonio 2016). According to existing academic literature, these Activity Centers are the most logical environment for a professional stadium location. The density of these centers can be leveraged to spur additional catalytic investments such as public transportation hubs and transit oriented mixed-use development. Notably, the AT&T Center was not selected as one of the thirteen regional growth centers in the SA Tomorrow plan. The non-inclusion of the AT&T Center shows a lack of faith in the potential of that area to develop and indicates the stadium’s failure to become a meaningful economic anchor for the community.

Conclusion

As private, for-profit enterprises professional sports franchises are incentivized to maximize their profits, a goal which is often directly not aligned with the public good. When considering using public funding for stadiums, local leaders must act in the public’s best interest. The Spurs organization has prospered during its relationship with the city of San Antonio. Since Peter Holt became the majority owner in 1996, the team has won five N.B.A. championships and the franchise value has grown from $48m to well over $1 billion in the present day. San Antonio undoubtedly has benefited from the Spurs as well. The team’s success has brought joy to its residents and increased the global profile of the city. However, after studying the cases of the Alamodome and the AT&T Center it is hard not to question public official’s judgement in using public funding. The AT&T Center and Alamodome projects represent over $360 million of public investment into San Antonio’s Eastside. As a city, we must ask if these facilities were the highest and best use of public funds for the Eastside and San Antonio as a whole.

The Alamodome’s location best positioned the stadium to be a catalyst for economic development, but it was never able to attract a tenant. It was foolish to speculatively make such a large public investment in the hopes of attracting an N.F.L. team to the city. The potential positive effects of a downtown stadium were muted by the absence of the right tenant to fill the space. In contrast, the AT&T Center had an extremely strong tenant in the Spurs, but the arena’s location and design muted it’s economic development potential. Instead of catalyzing the surrounding community, the stadium functions as a destination venue with no connectivity to the rest of the city.

What if the Alamodome was created for basketball instead of as a football? What if the AT&T Center was developed downtown, next to the Alamodome? These questions loom large, but the past cannot be changed and it is not productive to speculate on what could’ve been. We can however learn from the past in order to make better decisions in the future. My hope is that this comparative case study can act as a foundation for future research. This research was largely qualitative in nature, relying on city planning documents and first-hand written accounts. Future research could define a criteria of desired economic development outcomes for the communities surrounding sports stadium projects and use quantitative methods to determine the effectiveness of the two publicly funded projects in question. This continued research will have strong implications for important decisions that must be made in the near future. The Spurs’ twenty-five year lease with the AT&T Center ends 2026, which will prompt a major decision over the team’s future location. Spurs and city leadership must be equipped with an honest assessment of the past in order to make the best decisions for the future. In my opinion, there are three viable options for the Spurs: 1) Stay in their current location at the AT&T, 2) Pursue a new stadium in Downtown San Antonio (possibly within Hemisfair or Alamodome), or 3) Pursue a new stadium located between San Antonio and Austin that would anchor a commuter rail between the two cities. Transportation considerations are a critical component to economic development efforts and should be a key factor for decision makers when considering future stadium projects. Careful planning will be crucial to the success of our future region, and a new stadium potentially could be used to catalyze a major investment by the state and local government. This research leads me to believe that stadiums can play a legitimate role in economic development, but the city must be strategic and invest in projects that will meaningfully contribute to the development of our region.

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